Pīshraft va 'Aqlānīyat dar 'Ilm" Naẓarīyah'hā-yi Falsafī: Persiska (Farsi) 1403

The history of science is generally depicted as the history of the development of the best and most successful scientific theories. But does being better and more successful in a scientific theory also require it to be rational? And, in the competition between scientific theories and their evaluation, what is the place of their rationality? These simple questions posed many challenges for the contemporary philosophy of science, including whether science is fundamentally a rational activity or not, and if yes, how can scientific rationality be formulated, especially considering the judgment of history? But the uproar that this issue caused also spread to other issues, among which was the issue of the advancement of science. For example, the taken-for-granted notion that the history of science implies some kind of progress was challenged: The simple and linear progress of newer theories from the core of the previous theories, therefore, a clear and defensive formulation of the principle of the idea of ​​progress in science became necessary. This book is a collection of outstanding articles on two related issues of rationality and progress in science; Articles that at the same time are a strong testimony of the intertwining of the philosophy of science and the history of science.