Drabarah-yi rang'ha (3 zabanah): Persiska (Farsi) 1402

Believing that philosophical puzzles about color can only be solved by paying attention to language games, Wittgenstein used Goethe's propositions in Color Theory and the observations of Philipp Otto Color in an attempt to clarify the use of language about color in takes an opinion He also gives several examples of what we cannot but agree to say about colors, such as that green is not a combination of blue and yellow. It seems that an element of phenomenology is somehow involved here. Wittgenstein was interested in the fact that some propositions about color appear to be neither empirical nor precisely a priori, but somewhere in between, giving the impression of a Goethe-like phenomenology. However, Wittgenstein took the line, "in fact, there is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems." He was content to treat Goethe's observations as a form of logic or geometry. Wittgenstein cites some of his examples from Rong's letter at the end of "Farbenlehre", for example: "white is the brightest color", "transparent white does not exist", "reddish green does not exist" etc. The logical status of these propositions in Wittgenstein's research, including their relation to physics, is discussed in detail in Jonathan Westphal's Color: A Philosophical Introduction (1991).