عقلانیت در کنش الفارسية 1447

Rationality in Action is a foundational work in the philosophy of mind and action, in which John Searle critically examines traditional models of rationality and develops a new and profound framework for understanding human decision-making and agency. Searle argues that dominant models—those that describe rationality merely as a linear combination of beliefs and desires—are insufficient for explaining the complexity of human behavior.

At the center of his analysis is the notion of a “gap” between motives and action. This gap reveals the genuine intricacies of decision-making and opens space for the exercise of free will. According to Searle, individuals can choose and act among multiple—and often conflicting—considerations by drawing on their own deliberation and volition. Throughout the book, he offers a detailed critique of the “classical model” of rationality, which assumes that rational actions are direct outcomes of beliefs and desires and that rationality operates according to fixed rules. Searle demonstrates that such assumptions fail to capture the nuances of human reality.

Another key contribution of the book is Searle’s emphasis on reasons that are independent of desire. He argues that human beings may be motivated by considerations that extend beyond personal wants—such as moral commitments, social norms, or cultural values—factors that play an essential role in rational action. His discussion of weakness of will (akrasia) provides a fresh reinterpretation: rather than treating it as inherently irrational, Searle explains it as a common and intelligible outcome of motivational complexity and the distance between desire and action.

Searle also deepens the concepts of the self and rational deliberation, showing that rational reflection is not merely a mental process but a condition for understanding identity and personal continuity over time.

The implications of Rationality in Action extend widely across moral philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. By emphasizing the role of the self and the “gap” in rational agency, Searle offers a framework capable of illuminating the complexities of human agency, moral responsibility, and the experience of freedom. His critique of the classical model invites a rethinking of how rationality should be understood both theoretically and practically.

For readers seeking a rigorous and thought-provoking exploration of rationality, free will, and human agency, John Searle’s Rationality in Action is an insightful and intellectually rewarding choice.